

Plato *Republic* 4.427e6–14


<p>οἶμαι ἡμῖν τὴν πόλιν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς γε ὥκισται, τελέως ἀγαθὴν εἶναι. Ἀνάγκη γ', ἔφη. Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι σοφὴ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σώφρων καὶ δικάια. Δῆλον. Οὐκοῦν ὅτι ἂν αὐτῶν εὗρωμεν ἐν αὐτῇ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἔσται τὸ οὐχ ἡρῆμένον;</p>	<p>“I suppose that our city, if it’s really been founded correctly, is completely good.” “Inevitably,” he said. “Then clearly it’s intelligent, courageous, disciplined, and just.” “Clearly.” “Then whichever of them we find in it, what’s left will be what hasn’t yet been discovered?”</p>
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Two inferences


- 1) If a city is *agathê*, it is also at least *sophê*, *andreia*, *sôphrôn*, and *dikaia*.
- 2) If a city is *agathê*, it is also only *sophê*, *andreia*, *sôphrôn*, and *dikaia*.

Finding the remainder


Area A



Area B



Area C



Overview of *Republic* 6.484c–487a

- 485 b1–8 Philosophical natures desire to learn the whole of unchanging things.
 c3–d1 SO, they hate falsehood and desire truth, since truth is akin to knowledge (σοφία).
 d3–4 SO, they desire to learn the whole of **truth** (ἀληθεία).
 d6–e1 SO, they care only about psychic pleasures, not bodily pleasures.
 e3–5 SO, they are **disciplined** (σώφρων) rather than driven by money (φιλοχρήματος).
- 486 a4–6 FURTHER, they are not stingy (ἀνελεύθερος) or petty (σμικρολόγος), since they strive after the whole of everything.
 a8–10 SO, they share in **generosity** (μεγαλοπρέπεια [~ ἐλευθεριότης?]) and contemplate all of it.
 a10–b1 SO, they do not care much about life or death.
 b3–4 SO, they are not cowardly or stingy.
 — IMPLIED: they are **courageous** (ἀνδρείος) and generous.
 b6–7 SUMMING UP: they are **decent** (κόσμιος [~ σώφρων]) and not money-loving, not stingy, not fraudulent, and not cowardly.
 b7–8 SO, they are not unjust (ἄδικος) and not intractable in relationships (δυσσύμβολος).
 b10–12 SO, they are **just** (δικαίος) and **gentle** (ἥμερος) rather than antisocial and savage.
- c3–5 FURTHER, they are **sharp** (εὐμαθής), not dull (δυσμαθής); they can strive on.
 c7–d2 AND or SO, they are **retentive** (μνημονικός); the striving isn’t in vain.
- d4–11 FURTHER, they are **moderate** (ἔμμετρος) and **engaging** (εὖχαρις), and not uncultured (ἀμούσος) or indecorous (ἀσχήμων), since truth is akin to moderation.
- 487 a4–5 THUS, they are **retentive**, **sharp**, **generous**, **engaging**, and a friend and intimate of **truth**, **justice**, **courage**, and **discipline**.

Plato *Republic* 3.402c2–4

τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἶδη καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ ... γνωρίζωμεν	“We’ve got to recognize the forms of discipline and courage and independence and generosity and whatever siblings of them there are...”
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Plato *Meno* 73e–74a

{MEN.} ... ἐγὼ λέγω οὐ μόνον δικαιοσύνην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλας εἶναι ἀρετάς. {ΣΩ.} Τίνας ταύτας; εἰπέ. οἷόν καὶ ἐγὼ σοι εἵποιμι ἂν καὶ ἄλλα σχήματα, εἴ με κελεύεις· καὶ σὺ οὖν ἐμοὶ εἰπέ ἄλλας ἀρετάς.	MENO: ... I say that not only justice but other things are virtues, too. SOCRATES: What are they? Tell me. For example, I could list you other shapes, if you told me to. So now you tell me other virtues.
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{MEN.} Ἡ ἀνδρεία τοίνυν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀρετὴ εἶναι καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ σοφία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ ἄλλαι πάμπολλαι.	MENO: In that case, I think courage is a virtue, and discipline , and intelligence , and generosity , and a whole lot of others.
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Plato *Meno* 88a

{ΣΩ.} Ὅτι τοίνυν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν σκεψώμεθα. σωφροσύνην τι καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ εὐμαθίαν καὶ μνήμην καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα;	SOCRATES: We’ve yet to consider those things that pertain to the soul. You call something discipline , and something justice , and also courage , sharpness , retentiveness , generosity , and all those sorts of thing?
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Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1.6 1362b12–14

δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοψυχία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ τοιαῦται ἔξεις· ἀρεταὶ γὰρ ψυχῆς.	Justice, courage, discipline, dignity, generosity , and the other such states – these are the virtues of the soul.
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Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1.9 1366b1–2

μέρη δὲ ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, ἐλευθεριότης, φρόνησις, σοφία.	Parts of virtue: justice, courage, discipline, generosity, dignity, independence, reason, intelligence.
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Cratylus list of virtue terms

- 411d4 reason (φρόνησις)
- d6 judgment (γνώμη)
- e2 comprehension (νόησις)
- e4 discipline (σωφροσύνη)
- 412a1 knowledge (ἐπιστήμη)
- a4 understanding (σύνεσις)
- b1 intelligence (σοφία)
- c1 goodness (τἀγαθόν)
- c7 justice (δικαιοσύνη)
- 413d9 courage (ἀνδρεία)

Agesilaus list of virtue terms

- 3.2–5 εὐσεβεία
- 4 δικαιοσύνη with respect to money
- 5 καρτερία and ἐγκρατεία
- 6.1–3 ἀνδρεία
- 6.4–8 σοφία
- 7 φιλόπολις
- 8.1–2 τὸ εὐχαρί
- 8.3–4 μεγαλογνωμοσύνη
- 8.5 προνοία
- 8.6–7 <αὐτάρκεια>
- 9.1–2 <transparency and availability>
- 9.3–5 <αὐτάρκεια>

Plato *Republic* 6.490c2–11

<p>Ἦγουμένης δὴ ἀληθείας οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἴμαι φαμέν αὐτῇ χορὸν κακῶν ἀκολουθῆσαι. Πῶς γάρ; Ἀλλ' ὑγιές τε καὶ δίκαιον ἦθος, ᾧ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἔπεσθαι. Ὅρθως, ἔφη. ... μέμνησαι γάρ που ὅτι συνέβη προσῆκον τούτοις ἀνδρεία, μεγαλοπρέπεια, εὐμάθεια, μνήμη·</p>	<p>“With truth leading, I don’t think we’d ever say that a chorus of evils would bring up the rear.” “How could we?” “It’d instead be a sound and just character that follows, with discipline attached to it.” “That’s right.” “ ... And I’m sure you remember that it turned out that courage, generosity, sharpness, and retentiveness belong to them, too.”</p>
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Plato *Republic* 6.494b1–2

<p>ὡμολόγηται γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν εὐμάθεια καὶ μνήμη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια ταύτης εἶναι τῆς φύσεως.</p>	<p>“For we affirmed, didn’t we, that sharpness, retentiveness, courage, and generosity are characteristic of their [philosophical] nature?”</p>
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Plato *Republic* 6.503c1–2

<p>εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἔπεται</p>	<p>“the sharp and retentive, the keen and incisive, and whatever else is attached to them”</p>
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Scholarship on the passage

Nettleship (1897, 145–6): “[Plato] starts with accepted ideas; goodness shows itself in four main forms, the cardinal virtues of the Greeks. Every nation... has its own idea of virtue... and the Greeks conceived of complete virtue as showing itself under these four principal aspects.” Cf. Hackforth 1913, 266; Cornford 1912, 252.

Adam (1897, ad 427e): this is “the first explicit assertion of the doctrine of four cardinal virtues... there is no evidence to shew that these four virtues *and no others* were regarded as the essential elements of a perfect character before Plato,” but he is confident that it is a Platonic tenet.

Shorey (1930, 346n d): “Plato recognizes other virtues even in the *Republic* (402c: ἐλευθεριότης and μεγαλοπρέπεια, cf. 536a) and would have been as ready to admit that the number four was a part of his literary machinery as Ruskin was to confess the arbitrariness of his Seven Lamps of Architecture.” (347n e): Plato recognizes that “he is not proving anything by this method, but merely setting forth what he has assumed for other reasons.”

Bloom (1968, 373): “nothing has been done to establish that these four – and only these four – virtues are what makes a city good.” Cf. Kastely (2015, 93–94).

Annas (1981, 110–11): blames Plato for making things easier for himself, saying that he innovated with the list of four, and deploys a questionable method.

Waterfield (1993, note on 427e): “this is a fairly standard list of Greek cardinal virtues, reflected also in the discussion of the effects of literature at 386a ff.”

Pappas (1995, 74–5): Plato “turns an unexamined casual belief into a technical claim.”

Emlyn-Jones and Preddy (2013, lxx–lxxvi): “At this point Socrates introduces the traditional four cardinal virtues.”

Weiss (2015, 132n7): “the Greeks apparently had no fixed set of ‘cardinal’ virtues, despite the too-quick assumption by some scholars that they did.” Cf. Sachs (2007, 121n61).

Quandt (n. 101): “the quaternion is authoritative enough to support Socrates’s argument for the eliminative argument”; (n. 2116): “such a strong reliance on the traditional quadripartition of good ... is unwarranted (at least he says δῆλον rather than ἀνάγκη), but in the end it will lead to a tremendous heuristic success.”